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REVIEW ARTICLES
“Some Small Discrepancy”: 
Jean-Christophe Bailly’s  
Creaturely Ontology
ANAT PICK
Queen Mary, University of London.
The Animal Side. By Jean-Christophe Bailly. Translated by Catherine Porter. (New 
York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2011. 100 pp. Paperback and hardback. 
$18/$65. ISBN: 9780823234448 and 9780823234431.)
This article situates Jean-Christophe Bailly’s The Animal Side in the continuum of 
Continental philosophy on animality and animal ontology. Exploring Bailly’s linking 
of thought and vision and his insistence on the pivotal role of animals in the emergence 
of European art and image-making, I argue that the political dimension—a central 
implication of Bailly’s text—calls for further attention and development. This points to 
a broader concern within contemporary Continental theory on the subject of animals: 
the need to connect new human and animal ontologies with ethical, political, and 
normative models for the effective articulation of post-anthropocentric collectivities.
key words: animality, animals in human thought, Continental philosophy, animal 
ethics
TENDER IS THE NIGHT
And yet, because it is night, there is some small discrepancy, the soft but deep growl of 
something unknown. (Bailly, 2007)
Versant, in the title of Jean-Christophe Bailly’s Le versant animal, first published in French 
in 2007, means “side,” “slope,” or “hillside.” In The Animal Side, tilting geomorphologies 
serve as metaphors for thinking about the separate yet shared worlds of humans and 
animals and our sometimes tender, often cruel encounters. Bailly’s slender, 28-section 
essay, the first of his major texts to be translated into English, is concerned with animals’ 
presence in landscapes, real and imagined, but ultimately with the slips and slides of 
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thought, the drifts, grooves, and crevices that mark the mindscape of the nonhuman 
encounter.1 Sitting between, or alongside, Derrida’s later work and the writings of De-
leuze and Guattari, The Animal Side joins a growing list of Continental commentaries 
on animal life, an area only tangentially concerned with questions of ethics and distinct 
from the explicitly political fields of critical animal studies and animal rights.
 Part meditation on animal being, part commentary on the foundational place of ani-
mality in image-making and representation, in this work Bailly stalks animals through the 
selva oscura of the Western tradition—primarily Renaissance painting, post-metaphysical 
German philosophy, and post-Romantic and modern literature. The first two-thirds of 
the essay explores how art acknowledges the bond between humans and animals. In a 
series of readings of paintings by Paolo Uccello, Caravaggio, and Piero di Cosimo and 
the writings of Rilke, Thomas Mann, Karl Philipp Moritz, and Kafka, Bailly shows how, 
despite their apparent marginality, animals underwrite the works’ dimension of mean-
ing. The essay’s latter parts work through key philosophical ideas on animality to reclaim 
animals as the fundamental milieu of significance.
 Bailly pursues art and life as twin loci of meaning to which animals are key: First, 
animals open up possibilities for new meanings by confounding human thought. This 
argument is by now well rehearsed. If not the subjects of art, animals have at least been 
the recurring objects of artistic representation. As the repressed “other” of representa-
tion, animals’ role as vectors of meaning and human identity is confirmed. The second 
locus of meaning is more complex and has to do with seeing animals as “living beings 
immersed in significance” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 55). Bailly’s objective is to fuse these two 
significant aspects of animal life.
 Animals foster meaning by serving as a creative sidelining of thought, a “thought 
trace” both in the sense of Derridian conceptual excess and in the cartographic sense of 
what Bailly (2011a) calls the “pathway of thought” (p. 14). They chart unknown terrains 
by allowing thought to glimpse worlds beyond its comprehension and so set thought in 
motion. But animals are also themselves “something like a thought” (p. 13).2 The contact 
with other worlds (which Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, call devenir-animal) takes place in 
life, art, and thought neither as transference nor as transgression or dissolution of human 
identity, but as what signals the “general exposure of humanity to its original source, a 
peopling of the mind by that which surrounds it and which it may no longer see, no longer 
wish to see” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 12). Resuscitating such seeing is, then, at the very same 
time a defense of a certain conception of thinking as an affective and affecting encounter 
with an animal’s gaze; “an animal,” says Bailly (2011a), “is a form that looks at us” (p. 32).
 The verb “contemplate” serves as the etymological link between thinking and seeing. 
Contemplation (from con + templum, an open area for observation) is the “act of looking 
at,” from the Latin contemplari, “to gaze attentively, observe” (“Contemplation,” n.d.; 
see also Onions, 1966), as the Roman augurs did when “observing the flight of birds in 
a predetermined portion of the sky called templum” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 20) for constel-
lations of signs. Even in the superstitious act of bird watching, contemplation retained 
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its durational character as a “lengthening” (the Latin root temp means “to stretch”) that 
“attends to the time that time takes to pass” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 20). The history of con-
templation, from the augurs to Rodin’s Thinker, illustrates how thought is brought under 
control, focused, and internalized, its image in Rodin’s famous sculpture becoming visibly 
laborious, “an allegory of work” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 21). It is to reset thought on a more 
pensive trajectory, restore its wandering and “minor” qualities (“this minor thought—the 
thought that comes when we say we are thinking ‘about nothing’” [Bailly, 2011a, p. 22]), 
that Bailly invokes the encounter with animals.3
 One such encounter opens the book, and it is no accident that the description is 
familiar, somewhat cliché, or in Bailly’s terms, cinematic: A deer jumps out in front of 
a car at night, and for a moment, driver and animal meet. The scene employs the basic 
components of cinema: the mechanical and the organic, the thrust of the engine meeting 
the “quivering grace” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 1) of a warm mammalian body.
 In Electric Animal, Akira Mizuta Lippit (2000) explored the rearticulation of animal 
life as media loops at the point of the emergence of cinematic technology. For Bailly, 
animals are thinkable through the rhetoric of the image, but even as images, we meet 
them singularly and corporeally. The Animal Side is not an essay on film, but its fascina-
tion with cinema is everywhere present: “I would like to have a video camera set up,” 
Bailly (2011a) declares in the opening line, before switching to the third person: “The 
driver, going slowly now, follows the creature” (p. 1). The mysterious night drive, the 
unknown man at the wheel, the frightened deer, the camera’s sneaky advance up the 
road, the noirish cues are all here. If the atmospherics are overdetermined, they also 
assert the importance of film whose dreaminess lets us “touch with our eyes” what we 
cannot otherwise see or feel: “It was as if with my eyes, in that instant, for the duration 
of that instant, I had touched some part of the animal world. Touched, yes, touched with 
my eyes, despite the impossibility” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 2).
 This nocturnal anecdote reminds us that in the human imagination animals figure 
peripherally but universally and with absolute persistence; it tells us why we look at ani-
mals and why we should continue looking. Indeed, The Animal Side’s closest precursor in 
English is John Berger’s 1980 “Why Look at Animals?” and though Berger’s essay is not 
mentioned, Bailly’s 26th section on the animal painter Gilles Aillaud recalls it by proxy, 
since it is to Aillaud that Berger dedicated his own piece (Berger, 2009).
CONJUGATIONS OF BEING:  
UEXKÜLL, RILKE, HEIDEGGER
Written in the poetic-philosophical voice, The Animal Side engages with some of the major 
theorizations on animals in the Continental tradition, with Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of 
the Umwelt (an organism’s perceptual world) and Rilke’s “the Open” (das Offene) serving 
as the essay’s most cogent tropes.4 Other companions include Benjamin (in a fascinating 
section on objects and plants via a discussion of Benjaminian “aura” [Bailly, 2011a, pp. 
16–17]), Bataille (from whom Bailly borrows the phrase “lost intimacy,” which ancient 
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cave paintings convey and contemporary life all but forfeits), Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze 
and Guattari, and Derrida (as well as the philosopher’s cat).
 Bailly’s main argument, however, is with Heidegger (1995), who famously claimed 
that animals are “poor in world” (p. 185).5 Thinking through Rilke’s (as I later argue, dis-
putable) conceptualization of animals, Bailly (2011a) points out that the “absence of the 
categories of time, language, and death . . . is exactly what frees them, what arrays them 
in the intentionless realm of the open” (p. 19). Looking out into the open, the animal gaze 
is free from the “constant preoccupation with a past or a future, lured by interpretation” 
(p. 18). Bailly calls this gaze “pensive,” a term designed to bridge conceptual thought 
and “intelligence” and animals’ capacious contemplation, which is neither mindless nor 
introspective:
This pensivity on the part of animals, in which some have been willing to see only 
stupor, is in any case made manifest in a thousand different ways, according to species, 
individuals, and circumstances. It seems to me that certain people have seen this, have 
approached it, and that others, who may have glimpsed it, have turned away at once. 
(Bailly, 2011a, p. 15)
Whereas animals gaze pensively into the open, humans think purposively about the world 
they are building. But the realm of the open “is for Rilke the very space of the infinite 
wealth of which we ourselves are deprived” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 19). Thus, the open desig-
nates the dimension of animal “captivation” that Heidegger (1995) reads as “poor” but 
that Bailly contrasts to what we could call the “compulsory freedom” of humans, itself a 
captivation or a limit. And in a lovely contrary (to my mind Christian) turn, Bailly (2011a) 
suggests that if animals are indeed poor in world, “then at least one can and must plunge 
down into that poverty and contemplate it—a mystical vantage point here might have me 
say ‘contemplate’ it in all its splendor’” (p. 25). Calibrating downward, thinking through 
what is less or weaker than, instead of endowing animals with additional powers to sup-
posedly match our own, is a more interesting and promising project since it suggests that 
humanity itself is “less than” what our self-aggrandizing would have us believe.
 Two internally contradictory orders of freedom emerge in Bailly’s ontological account, 
which alter human self-image. Though human entrepreneurial consciousness is geared 
toward world-building, and animality is nestled within rather than oriented toward its 
environment, “Bildung, which is the proper domain of human beings and the means 
by which they constitute themselves as freedom, is at the same time the domain that 
has always had to bid goodbye to that other radiant freedom, that of the open” (Bailly, 
2011a, p. 18). On the one hand, animals’ absorption in their world is an impoverishment, 
whereas on the other, Dasein’s Bildung is a captive of its own relentless “unveiling” and 
is unable to access the open. Each modality suggests a different form of non-freedom: 
Animals are “stuck” in the open, and humans roam the confines of intentional conscious-
ness. Pensivity, then, need not be viewed as a deficiency of (human) thought but can be 
viewed as the gateway to a different structure or “conjugation of the verb to be” (Bailly, 
2011a, p. 46), indicating the eccentricity of human thought and the existence of other 
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modes of being and thinking (Bailly, 2011a, p. 49)—the presence alongside us of other 
worlds, of multiple nonhuman Umwelten.
 As with Rilke’s open, Bailly finds Heidegger’s appropriation of Uexküll’s Umwelt theory 
overly negative. Heidegger “turned the meaning of Umwelt to his own advantage—that 
is, to the benefit of the thesis according to which animals are ‘poor in world,’” inhabiting 
“captive systems” that doom animals to “stupor and repetition” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 48). 
Heidegger’s use of Rilke’s open and Uexküll’s Umwelt, Bailly suggests, diminishes these 
concepts, leaving Heidegger’s own philosophical Umwelt substantially poorer.
 Bailly’s reading of Rilke and Uexküll speaks to the broader disputes between mecha-
nistic and nonmechanistic theorizations of life. Uexküll, whose work influenced Rilke 
and Heidegger (as well as Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze), positioned himself between the 
mechanistic Darwinian view and the teleological view (held by Karl Ernst von Baer and 
later revised by Uexküll himself) of nature working according to a plan, imbued with 
meaning beyond crude programming. Bailly (2011a) too navigates the tensions between 
mechanics and meaning, between life as the accidental unfolding of physical law and an 
organism’s subjective “improvisation” (p. 54). Whereas in the life sciences, mechanistic 
biological reductionism has won the debate, making additional inroads into the fields of 
psychology and culture (the rise of evolutionary psychology being one example), critical 
theory’s recent turn to animality and the concept of “life” provides Uexküll’s philosophi-
cal biology with new traction. Uexküll’s description of nonhuman worlds whose inner 
workings are the result of meaningful (biosemiotic) exchanges between an organism 
and its surrounding environment affords even simple animals (e.g., the tick) subjective 
experience and depicts nature as a melodious whole made up of a harmonious network 
of multiple Umwelten.
 Siding with Uexküll and drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s 1950s lectures collected in Na-
ture: Course Notes From the Collège de France, Bailly wants to bridge the gap between 
mechanistic captivation and subjective meaning-making. For Uexküll, animals are not 
machines placed in a given environment but authors of their Umwelt. An Umwelt is 
the sum of intelligible exchanges between an organism and its environment. Human 
and nonhuman Umwelten are open systems, continually reconstituting themselves as 
“procedures of intelligibility” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 49): “To be sure, each animal is caught in 
the net of its own space-time, but there is always an opening: the systems—as evolution 
demonstrates—are not closed” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 49). Not only do animals inhabit their 
Umwelt meaningfully; in their respective Umwelten, animals embody different possibili-
ties of meaning—different forms of thought.
 If meaning is indeed inherent in the universe, then art and life emerge as forms 
of lively expression beyond the strictly mechanical. We could even speak of the art of 
other species, such as the flight of bats, which is “pure excitability, pure exploratory 
inebriation,” “like a dance” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 51). Are the metaphors and simile here 
merely rhetorical? Bailly thinks not. Flying is a vital part of the bat’s quest for food, 
but “whatever role this quest plays in the bat’s activity, the predatory function does not 
exhaust the meaning of its flight,” which Rilke describes as “anguished”: tinged with 
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fear, the result of the “composite character of an animal ‘obliged to fly’ even though it 
is ‘womb-born’” (quoted in Bailly, 2011a, p. 52). The seamless transition from observ-
ing to interpreting the bat’s flight is deliberate, and Bailly rejects the idea that Rilke’s 
recognition of something like anguish in the bat’s way of being is sheer poetic license 
or anthropomorphism:
One can no more sum up the meaning of the bat’s flight as fear than one can reduce it 
to a pure and simple functional sweeping of space. Something else is here—joy, too, 
no doubt—in this strange and perpetually erased sketch that the bat improvises every 
evening anew. (Bailly, 2011a, p. 52)
The peculiarities of animal behavior suggest an “exuberant” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 54) dimen-
sion of life, beyond mere mechanics. Such moments of passion, waste, or excess are what 
legitimately link the flight of bats to Rilke’s Eighth Elegy.6
 Some of the essay’s finest passages are those that comment on artists who have gazed 
generously into the open and have seen animals as more than just functional. Examples 
from painting, literature, and film—the cave paintings in Lascaux, Uccello’s Hunt in the 
Forest (ca. 1470), Caravaggio’s Rest on the Flight into Egypt (ca. 1597), Piero di Cosimo’s 
A Satyr Mourning Over a Nymph (ca. 1495), a 1913 photograph of Kafka and his dog, 
and Jim Jarmusch’s 1995 film Dead Man—articulate the bond, or “pact,” between humans 
and animals, according to which animals are recognized for all that they are: opaque and 
embodied, beloved and remote, fearful and vulnerable, acknowledged in their “prece-
dence” and “seniority” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 62) and their singularity and impending extinc-
tion. Representations of this kind constitute what I elsewhere have called a “creaturely 
poetics,” of which Bailly provides his own examples (Pick, 2011). So in Kafka,
animals seem to be resurfacing from some obscure depths . . . and appropriating human 
language for themselves in order to shed light on those depths. With the small rodents 
in particular, there is almost something like a transference, involving a whole set of 
infinitesimal notations of sound and touch, a whole repertory of touch manifesting the 
sensation involved. (Bailly, 2011a, p. 39)
 Aillaud, on the other hand, enters the “sphere in which the silence of painting em-
braces animal silence, that is, the place where animals, condemned to visibility by the 
way they are displayed in zoos, expose only their being, their way of passing into being, 
like dense and compact fragments” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 66). Nicolas Philibert’s documen-
tary Nenette (2010), about an aging female orangutan in the Paris Ménagerie du Jardin 
des Plantes, achieves this density. The languorous takes of the 41-year-old great ape in 
her cage impress on the viewer the heaviness and indolence that captivity and constant 
display inflict on zoo animals.
 In examining the human–animal pact, Bailly (2011a) moves freely between painting 
and film, viewing cave paintings not so much proto-cinematic as similar to cinema in the 
work they do—registering the simultaneous separation and contact between human and 
animal worlds (p. 9).7 The Lascaux and Chauvet caves express the primary “cleavage” 
between humans and animals.
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[They] point to an origin or an originary state of designation, and . . . can be understood 
as a first, stupefying recording in which, at the heart of nature as a whole, the animal is 
recognized as the great other, the first companion. (Bailly, 2011a, p. 9)
Crucially, the human–animal pact displaces violence: “Through their representation of 
animals something is taken away from violence” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 10). What, then, should 
we make of the frequent use of animals in contemporary art? Does it suggest an altered 
“state of designation,” a redrafted pact? Some recent art that portrays (and contains) 
animals does not commute violence but redoubles and replays it. Work of this kind offers 
no separate space for art to register a “lost intimacy” with animals. To criticize the work 
of Damien Hirst, for example, on ethical grounds is not simply to object to the artist’s 
use and killing of animals, but to critique the work’s artistic provenance: its enacting of 
a relation to animals that is not a commutation of violence. In Hirst, nothing is “taken 
away from violence” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 10). To put it another way, Hirst’s art is chemical, 
not alchemical—though it follows the physiological and biochemical cycles of life, death, 
and decay, nothing within the work or around it really mutates.
 Bailly’s (2011a) readings of specific artworks distinguish between two pivotal orienta-
tions of representation, falling on one side or the other “of a fault line running through 
literature (but through philosophy, anthropology, and the natural sciences as well)”:
On one side there would be the clan of those who dominate, those who will never let 
animals cross the threshold except in agreed-upon forms that keep them at a distance 
no matter what; and on the other side, there would be those who are incapable of 
regulating that distance, those who are troubled by the slightest gap or the slightest 
glimmer, and for whom the question of the division between humans and animals is 
not only not settled once and for all but arises at every moment, on every occasion, as 
soon as an animal comes into view. It would be a little like a mountain with two sides: 
one without animals, the other where animals are present—the second being the only 
one, as I see it, that is illuminated by the sun. (Bailly, 2011a, pp. 38–39)
The contention is simple and sweeping: Forms of expression inattentive to animals are 
deficient (or, as Bailly puts it, in the dark). Animals are the beings without whom our 
experience, be it artistic, philosophical, ethical, or political, cannot be properly under-
stood and expressed and thus cannot be critiqued and improved. Art and thought that 
resist the profound exposure to animals are faulty conceptually, in terms of their claims 
to truth, and affectively, in terms of the experience they try to convey. In other words, 
human endeavor is indispensably creaturely.
ETHICS AND POLITICS ON THE ANIMAL SIDE
Concrete political and ethical questions pose a particular challenge in The Animal Side. 
Despite the potential radicalism of multiple worlds, the challenging of traditional hi-
erarchies between humans and animals through pensivity, and the subtle portrayal of 
pathways that crisscross the terrains of human and nonhuman beings, certain tropes in 
Bailly’s account remain politically problematic.
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 However malleable Bailly’s definition of the gaze as a constellation of affect, vision, 
and thought is, the politics of the gaze divides the “community of the reservoir of exis-
tence” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 26) between those who do and do not look back at us, leaving 
out creatures and life forms (insects, microbes, plants, and so on) who fall outside the 
purview of looking. In this, Bailly’s ethics reflects a liberal, contractual understanding of 
sociality. Bailly (2011a) explains that “even if the ability to look is not evenly distributed, 
it exists in a latent state; it is a characteristic of the animal world as such” (p. 26). He is 
adamant that community begins with the sense of sight:
It is through sight that we recognize that we are not the only ones who see, that we know 
that others see us, look at us, contemplate us. The major difference that splits living 
beings into two categories is found along the line of sight, and sight is inseparable from 
blood and mobility—this is the world of heterotrophic beings. Outside of this world lies 
the vegetable kingdom, that is, the world of autotrophic beings, those beings that do 
not need to move in order to find food. (Bailly, 2011a, pp. 26–27)
There is much that is intellectually pleasing in the effervescent flow of distinctions (which 
inevitably give way to additional splits, as in part 12, which includes subdivisions of the 
vegetal group, among which Bailly counts flowers as a form of the “fractal sublime,” but 
from which he subtracts fruits and grains because of their “volumetric density” [Bailly, 
2011a, p. 29]). In his discussion of Benjamin, Bailly (2011a) comes close to admitting 
that inanimate things can also look back, that objects radiate, their “aura” marking “the 
entry of things into the regime of significance” (p. 17). But whereas Benjamin speaks of 
a thing’s image, not of its inherent capacity to return a look, animals “have this power 
on their own” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 17). There is no denying the force of meeting another 
animal’s gaze. Ontologically and ethically, however, the notion that fellow beings must 
look back at us, or that animals are essentially those beings who look back, privileges one 
type of encounter, whose humanist credentials are all but exhausted and which forecloses 
other, far-reaching possibilities of zoo- and biocentric relations. With its latent narcissism 
and frequent oversights, the paradigm of exchanged looks does not offer an exhaustive 
or even satisfactory model for a posthumanist ethics.
 A related problem is Bailly’s overemphasis of the human/animal binary. Like Derrida, 
Bailly’s distinctions enumerate rather than reduce the differences between living beings 
so as to unseat their hierarchical positioning. Nevertheless, the designation of animals 
as our radical others can at times feel like willful enchantment, at the expense of more 
worldly relations.8 Phrases such as “animal silence” that relegate animals to a realm 
before language are awkward at best, and they place Bailly at the antihumanist end of 
the Romantic trajectory. I find him at his most impressive when he is revising Rilke and 
Heidegger or revisiting works of the European humanist canon. Yet what are the political 
ramifications of this residual Romanticism?
 If The Animal Side makes a general case for non-anthropocentric forms of expression, 
not just art but also political life must open to the pensive dimension. “The pensivity of 
animals, or at least what I am trying to designate and grasp with the term,” Bailly (2011a) 
writes, “is neither a diversion nor a curiosity.”
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What is established is that the world in which we live is gazed upon by other beings, 
that the visible is shared among creatures, and that a politics could be invented on that 
basis, if it is not too late. (Bailly, 2011a, p. 15; emphasis added)
What sort of politics, of community, does Bailly have in mind that begins with the animal 
gaze? The question of politics becomes more explicit in the essay’s closing sections. Politics 
is perhaps the most difficult domain for working out what opening up to animals and to 
animality actually means, what it demands of us, and what it might look like. Although 
Bailly calls for regarding animals’ lives as possessing their own meaning and value, his 
political vision is fairly obscure.
 Postbinary, posthuman theories of life—Donna Haraway’s most notably—neither 
yield a particularly radical political program nor provide new normative frameworks in 
favor of animals. Unlike Haraway’s relational model of multi-critter assemblages that 
traverse all material life, Bailly (2011a) distinguishes individual—or rather finite—forms, 
such as animals, from “nonfinite forms” (p. 28), such as most plants. The difference in 
sensibility that informs Bailly and Haraway’s respective posthumanisms can perhaps be 
understood as one of valence. Whereas Haraway’s multivalent aggregations of matter 
describe post-anthropocentric collectives as they already are, what looks like Bailly’s 
lingering liberalism, his attachment to individual persons and forms, feels nostalgic.
 Bailly argues,
It is only when animals are taken out, or kept out, of the landscape that the equilibrium 
is shattered and that we shift to a regime that is no longer even one of brutality, but 
rather a regime of dark times in which what is taken away from animals corresponds to 
the very eradication of all relations with them and to the destruction of any possibility 
of experience. (p. 65)
In writing this, he might be wishing for a return to small family farms and localized, “sus-
tainable” slaughter, to “better” forms of animal husbandry (and killing), as if these do not 
pose serious ethical problems. What is more, encounters between humans and animals 
need not be bucolic. They are urban too. Bailly is right that the presence or absence of 
animals defines a space. Recent decades have shown that it is not only from the “wild” 
that animals have disappeared. Their presence (not unlike that of the youthful poor) in 
urban areas has come under new controls. A pensive approach to public space—allowing 
for whimsicality, encouraging loitering and hanging about, compromising what Derrida 
called autoimmunity (e.g., Derrida, 2003)—where animals, or at the very least compan-
ion animals, are welcome (on streets and in shops, classrooms, and most other human 
establishments, with or without their human caregivers) may sound scandalously “third 
world.” But the disciplinary divisions along welfarist and hygienic lines need redrawing 
if we want to share spaces with other animals as our urban fellows. The result may not 
be idyllic, but it follows from Bailly’s insistence on the significance of seeing (or rather, 
meeting and touching) living, breathing animals in everyday landscapes.9
 At the more radical end, the regime of visibility Bailly describes taps into a common 
sensation:
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When we see ewes, cows, or goats wandering in the fields, or even when we go into 
a barn or a stable, what informs our first impression is not a fantasy of domination or 
mastery, nor is it an economic phenomenon or a technological stratum: there is always, 
suspended like a daydream perhaps—but one that would be an integral part of the 
manna, the sensation of harmony, of a peaceful possibility—a tranquil surge of the 
world into itself. (Bailly, 2011a, p. 64) 
The utopian note of the shift from a purely instrumental relation to commodity animals 
is unmistakable, but there is here also an appeal to concrete experience that bears the 
utopian trace. The “sensation of harmony” (what Emily Dickinson more reservedly de-
scribed as “a transport of cordiality”) is real enough. The “peaceful possibility” awakened 
by the encounter with animals underpins the public advocacy of many farmed animal 
sanctuaries. But let us not forget that this is also the experience offered by city and other 
small farms as well as by petting zoos to which parents take their young children before 
proceeding to consume animal flesh and secretions.
 Although the political dimension of The Animal Side remains equivocal, there are 
germs here of an explicit critique of, for example, environmental political discourse. “It 
is one thing,” Bailly (2011a) argues, “to invoke ‘biodiveristy’ as an abstract right, using 
its abstract name; it is something else again to attend very closely to the multiplicity of 
exposures and states through which the animal world is revealed and concealed” (p. 46). 
In the penultimate section, having run through the outbreaks of avian flu and mad cow 
disease, the Chernobyl disaster (to which we now add Fukushima), and the ongoing 
threat and fait accompli of mass extinction, Bailly posits an apocalyptic scenario: “The sky 
without birds, the oceans and rivers without fish, the earth without tigers or wolves, ice 
floes melted with humans below and nothing but humans fighting over water resources. 
Is it even possible to want that?” (Bailly, 2011a, p. 75). His reply is at once the sharpest 
and most vague of political statements:
In relation to this tendency, which seems ineluctable, every animal is a beginning, an 
engagement, a point of animation and intensity, a resistance.
 Any politics that takes no account of this (which is to say virtually all politics) is a 
criminal politics. (Bailly, 2011a, p. 75)
The strengths and weaknesses of the Continental style are evident here in that there is 
as yet no coherent, elaborate, and sustained alternative to mainstream political discourse 
governed by such concepts as biodiversity, resource and population “management,” and 
the economic value of nature. What can theory that draws on contributions from Con-
tinental philosophy, poststructuralist critiques of foundationalism, power relations, sub-
jectivity, and liberal-humanist political models have to offer by way of a programmatic 
commitment to nonhuman animals?
 There is currently a small resurgence of works on other, more inclusive, less criminal 
politics, but it comes principally from the liberal wing of political theory (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka, 2012; Garner, 2012). If there is a need for what I should note is at once lauded 
and dismissed as a “poetic” engagement with animals (“poetic” is too easily shorthand for 
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political and ethical respite), articulations have to be found that are practical and norma-
tive and that yet retain the slippages, the multiplicities, the “melancholic outpourings” 
(Bailly, 2011a, p. 32), the pensivity even that the Continental tradition—or better still, 
that thought on the animal side—can illuminate. This, it seems to me, is where Bailly’s 
essay beckons and where we must go.
Notes
 1. There are particular convergences between The Animal Side and Bailly’s subsequent Le 
Dépaysement: Voyages en France (2011b).
 2. The notion of animals as thought is reminiscent of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s (1964) claim in 
“Le Totemisme Aujourd’hui” that “animals are good to think” (sometimes translated as “good 
to think with”).
 3. Bailly’s idea of minor thinking has some affinity with Leonard Lawlor’s (2007) Derridian 
notion of “not thinking” (“comment ne pas penser”). In response to animals’ supposed thought-
lessness, “we could ask how not to think” (Lawlor, 2007, p. 80). This not-thinking is double-edged: 
“On the one hand, it means not thinking at all (shall we say, not thinking at all like a beast?), 
and, on the other, it means an injunction to think well” (Lawlor, 2007, p. 80).
 4. See Jakob von Uexküll (2010). For a discussion of Rilke’s “the open” vis-à-vis both Uexküll 
and Heidegger, see Giorgio Agamben (2004).
 5.  In part 2 of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (1995), 
Heidegger advances his “three theses” (p. 185) that “the stone is worldless, the animal is poor 
in world, man is world-forming” (p. 185).
 6. In this section, Bailly recasts rather than replies to Thomas Nagel’s famous question: What 
it is like to be a bat? See Nagel (1979).
 7. On cave paintings as proto-cinematic, see Werner Herzog’s 2010 documentary Cave of 
Forgotten Dreams. The film was shot in 3D inside the Chauvet caves, and it offers a reflection 
on the idea of cinema as at once predating and postdating the photographic technology of film.
 8. I thank Robert McKay for making me think through this point.
 9. These thoughts on shared urban space with animals draw on Krithika Srinivasan’s (2012) 
work on street dogs in the developed and developing world. See, for example, “The Biopolitics 
of Animal Being and Welfare.”
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